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FOREWORD
Lieutenant Colonel Clarence Bouchat conceived this
paper while teaching theater strategy on the Distance
Education faculty at the U.S. Army War College. As
an adjunct member of the resident course teaching
team, he also observed resident students wrestle with
the subject. While the Strategic Studies Institute does
not normally publish curricular materials, this is the
second time a subject has been deemed of sufficient
importance and utility that it is now offered to our
wider audience.
Theater strategy and theater security cooperation
(TSC) are two of the most important tools available
in attaining national security. They offer an effective
means for geographic Combatant Commanders to
engage other countries, deter aggression, or resolve
crises. Despite their importance, however, little
current, concise, and comprehensive guidance is
available on how they are planned and implemented.
This Letort Paper offers a framework to explain what
theater strategy is, its basis, how it is formulated, and
how it is executed with emphasis on theater security
cooperation. With this background, a reader interested
in or involved with the development, execution, or
support of theater strategy will better understand its
role in defense and national affairs through examples
from a case study of the formulation of theater strategy
and security cooperation in U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM) leading up to Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish
this Letort Paper as a contribution to a more complete
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understanding of theater strategy and theater security
cooperation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This overview of theater strategy and theater
security cooperation is a primer on one of the most
important tools the U.S. military uses to engage other
countries, deter unwanted actions, and defend U.S.
and friendly nation interests. To be effective, theater
strategy and theater security cooperation must be
derived from and consistently linked to national
and multinational strategic guidance and policy,
and formulated to meet the requirements found in
each region. To attain the combatant commander’s
strategic security goals, proper support for joint
operation plans through organizational structure,
force projection, sustainment, readiness training, and
force development input is essential. Theater security
cooperation directly supports national goals at the
regional level, and enhances military operations by
obviating the need for military action, or by preparing
the environment better for U.S. military intervention,
should it be necessary. Theater strategy is an important
part of realizing national strategy around the world,
and theater security cooperation is not only one of the
most powerful tools in attaining the goals of theater
strategy, but, through its ability to obviate the need for
combat, a cost effective tool as well.
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AN INTRODUCTION TO THEATER STRATEGY
AND REGIONAL SECURITY
CENTCOM found itself in a bubbling pot of crises from
one end to the other. We had to develop a CENTCOM
[theater] strategy to handle them . . . without necessarily
using military force—or else only as a last resort. We
needed to help build stability in this troubled region, in
my view, or we would pay the price in the long run.
General Anthony Zinni
Central Command Commander, 1997-2000
from Battle Ready, written with Tom Clancy, p. 319

THEATER STRATEGY
Since the demise of the Soviet Union and its allies
as an overarching worldwide opponent, regional
security issues have risen as the greatest challenge
for U.S. national security. Even the Global War on
Terrorism is a chain of regional problems linked
by an amorphous network based on an extremist
philosophy and anti-Western sentiment. Since regional
problems now dominate security issues, the primary
contribution towards attaining U.S. national, defense,
and military strategy by the Department of Defense
(DoD) is at the theater level through the combatant
commander’s theater strategy. Theater strategy
coordinates both the use of force and the many other
military activities supporting national strategy that do
not involve force, since not all security problems can or
should be resolved with kinetic solutions. Despite its
importance to military and national strategy, however,
there is little definitive or comprehensive information
available on theater strategy. For that reason, this
paper acts as a framework to integrate the concept,


processes, products, and activities associated with
theater strategy. It introduces the implementation of
national strategy at the theater and operational levels
by explaining what theater strategy is, its basis, how it
is formulated, and how it is executed with emphasis
on theater security cooperation. With this background,
a reader involved with the development, execution, or
support of theater strategy will better understand its
role in defense and national affairs through examples
from a case study of the formulation of theater strategy
and security cooperation in U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM) leading up to Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan.
Theater Strategy Overview.
Joint Publications 3-0, Joint Operations, and 5-0, Joint
Operation Planning, use this new, broader definition of
theater strategy:
Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing
the objectives of national and multinational policies and
strategies through the synchronized and integrated
employment of military forces and other instruments of
national power.1

Theater strategy directs military activities ranging
from peacetime cooperation with other countries,
to meeting potential threats through contingency
planning (previously known as deliberate planning)
and crisis action planning. Theater strategy organizes
a theater’s forces and operational areas, and arranges
the relationship among them to ensure unified action.
Theater strategy also ensures adequate logistics and
other support for theater activities, and synchronizes
joint, multinational, and interagency operations


and training.2 All of this maintains military unified
action within a geographic region to achieve strategic
goals. Such unified action in theater strategy must be
maintained even while some regions of the theater are
in conflict, and others remain at peace.3 Thus theater
strategy must be broad enough to encompass a wide
variety of political-military activities at the same time.
Campaigns, military operations, security cooperation,
and use of the operational art—each is a part of
theater strategy throughout the continuum of military
activities.
Theater strategy is an extension of national
military strategy tailored to a geographic combatant
commander’s area of responsibility (AOR). It is both
similar and in complementary support to national
strategy (see Figure 1). A combatant commander’s
theater strategy consists of the three elements found in
any strategy: theater objectives and strategic end states
NATIONAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION
Role of the President and Secretary of Defense
National Security Strategy

National Defense Strategy

National Strategy for HomelandSecurity
Contingency Planning Guidance

Strategic Planning Guidance
Security Cooperation Guidance

Role of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Role of the
Combatant Commander

Joint Strategy Review

Strategic Estimate

National Military Strategy
Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan

Theater Strategy

Continuous
Interaction

Security Cooperation
Plan

Global Plans

Plans and Orders

Joint Strategic
Planning System

Joint Operation Planning
And Execution System

Unified Action in Execution

Figure 1. National Strategic Direction
(Joint Pub 3-0, Fig I-1).


(ends), which are achieved through the synchronization
of integrated strategic concepts (ways), by using theater
organization, activities, and plans employing joint,
interagency, and multinational resources (means),
and thereby accomplishes national and multinational
objectives.4
The geographic combatant commander is the
focus for developing and executing theater strategy.
Theater strategy should be coordinated with other
regional elements of power, as is done with national
strategy in the interagency process. The Department
of State’s (DoS) Assistant Secretaries of State direct
Regional Bureaus, but they have less authority and
resources than a geographic combatant commander
has, and the regional areas used by DoS and DoD do
not coincide (see Figure 2). Diplomatically, national
strategy is mainly applied at the country level
through the U.S. ambassador and the country team.
At the country team level, DoD representatives such
as the defense and military service attaches, and the
combatant commander’s security assistance officers,
work together with the representatives from the
other federal government agencies in the embassy to
attain national strategic goals as interpreted by the
President’s personal representative, the ambassador.
The country team military representatives must
balance the ambassador’s guidance with that of
their DoD commanders.5 At the country level, this
system works when both sides reference and use the
common national strategic direction—the National
Security Strategy from which is derived the DoS and
U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID)
Strategic Plan, and DoD’s National Defense Strategy.6 On
a regional level, however, there is no equivalent of the
National Security Council or a regional security strategy
to coordinate efforts among the various U.S. federal
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Figure 2. DoD Combatant Commanders AORs
and DoS Regional Bureau Areas.
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agencies, much less internationally with like-minded
states. This sometimes gives the geographic combatant
commander a stronger comparative influence in
the region when he directs a comprehensive theater
strategy.
To compound the imbalance between DoS and
DoD further, the DoS simply lacks the depth of
personnel and resources given to DoD.7 The DoS, for
instance, has fewer than a brigade’s worth of Foreign
Service Officers (4,000-5,000 people) in the field. Their
resources for tangible engagement activities also do
not match the opportunities that DoD’s schools, visits,
exercises, equipment, and other cooperation activities
offer. Thus an imbalance has occurred where DoS has
the authority for international engagement, but DoD
has most of the resources to do so.
There also are no economic and information
regions, equivalent to the DoD AORs and DoS Regional
Bureaus, in which the other elements of national power
are planned or coordinated, further weakening national
strategic direction at the regional level. All of these
challenges to the development and implementation
of theater strategy emphasize the need to keep theater
security in very close support of national strategy, and
for government officers to work towards common
goals.
Sources of Theater Strategy.
The national strategic direction that a theater
commander receives should initiate and guide the
development of theater strategy. National strategic
direction is the common thread that integrates and
synchronizes the activities of the U.S. military with
other government agencies, and is derived from
national values, interests, and policy.8 The President


and Secretary of Defense translate policy into strategic
and defense end states and objectives, which are
reflected in the National Security Strategy (NSS),
National Defense Strategy (NDS), the Unified Command
Plan (UCP), Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG),
Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and Joint Programming
Guidance (JPG), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the
“Forces For Unified Commands” memorandum, and
national policy and multinational policy statements
and goals when the United States is operating as part
of an alliance or coalition.9 The interplay between these
guiding documents is shown in Figure 3.
To digest the direction given, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) uses the resources of the
Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the consultation
means by which the CJCS develops strategy, plans,
budgets, and assessments.10 Thus the JSPS provides
some of the strategic guidance and direction to U.S.
armed forces for theater security cooperation planning,

Strategy: Foundation for all Major Processes
Planning, Programming and Budgeting
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Figure 4. Joint Strategic Planning
(Joint Pub 5-0, Figure I-1).
joint operation planning, and force planning (see
Figure 4).11 The CJCS refines this direction further for
the combatant commanders in the form of the National
Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan (JSCP), Global Force Management, and other forms
of guidance.12
The process and documents, cited above, work
well for contingency planning. However, in the
unanticipated circumstances and short time period that
usually follow a crisis, less formal forms of national
direction are given. When existing plans and guidance
are applicable, they should be used although they are
normally supplemented by additional direction as
the circumstance’s intelligence and situation become
better known. Memos and verbal guidance from the
President, Secretary of Defense, or CJCS may initiate
or change a plan or theater strategy, to be followed by
more formal planning directives such as a Warning
Order, Planning Order, or Alert Order.13 Other forms
of timely and flexible direction during a crisis are the
national policy statements, speeches, and other forms



of strategic communication that inform the U.S. and
international public. Strategic communications from
the President and cabinet secretaries establish unity
of themes and messages, and as such can be a major
source of national security direction in a crisis situation
when little documented guidance may be available.14
Joint strategic planning from the theater strategy
level, be it contingency or crisis planning, should
contribute to the President and Secretary of Defense’s
formulation of political-military assessments, define
political and military objectives, develop strategic
concepts and options, allocate resources, and formulate
policy.15 Ultimately, national strategic direction
guides theater strategy, but together the geographic
combatant commands’ theater strategies also influence
strategic direction. The Secretary of Defense melds
these theater strategies to ensure that the relative
importance of the combatant commands’ competing
interests are prioritized and integrated, and that they
adequately support strategic goals in a limited resource
environment. This resulting global strategy is the
bridge coordinating national and theater strategies.16
Vignette 1: Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2002, pp. 24-26, 189-190.
In his book, Bob Woodward chronicles the formation
of strategic direction for the response that led to OEF.
These passages show how national direction for theater
strategy is formed in a crisis. This reading opens with
the attack on the Pentagon. The author notes the lack
of a contingency plan against Afghanistan, so the
Secretary of Defense starts forming the first draft of
strategic direction, by defining the problem. Three
weeks later, in the second reading, the Secretary issues
very clear strategic guidance to DoD to use for crisis
action planning.


Theater Strategy Formulation.
From the interlocking sources that form strategic
direction, the combatant commander provides comprehensive guidance and direction to his subordinates
and staff to formulate theater strategy. To craft theater
strategy effectively, however, the commander and staff
must understand in depth the context of the theater
and its mission, which is typically achieved through
developing a strategic (or theater) estimate.17 Once
the theater’s environment and mission are analyzed
and understood, the commander’s vision for theater
security is formed. From the resulting theater objectives
the theater concept is derived and codified into theater
strategy and its implementing actions and plans.
A strategic estimate starts with a review of the
complex and interconnected theater environment (see
Figure 5). This contextual review sets the parameters
within which to frame the combatant commander’s
theater actions and plans. This review must take
into account the geographic, economic, and cultural
STRATEGIC ESTIMATE
• Assigned objectives from national authorities.
• Translation of national objectives to objectives applicable to the
combatant commander or theater.
• Visualization of the strategic environment and how it relates to the
accomplishment of assigned objectives.
• Assessment of the threats to accomplishment of assigned objectives.
• Assessment of strategic alternatives available, with accompanying
analysis, risks, and the requirements for plans.
• Considerations of available resources, linked to accomplishment of
assigned objectives.

Figure 5. Strategic Estimate Overview
(Joint Pub 5-0, Figure I-3).
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characteristics of the region; the geo-political context
of regional influences, causes, and interests; and an
understanding of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of
each friendly, neutral, and adversarial state or relevant
organization in the region. This review must also
account for the U.S. situation, including limitations
in the form of constraints, restraints, and restrictions;
planning assumptions18 (which should be periodically
reviewed for validity); and deduce relative power and
capabilities. A theater’s environment is best analyzed
through a systems approach. This is an integrated,
holistic perspective that improves understanding,
and generates more options than just military actions
through force. “With a systems perspective, [commanders] gain the situational awareness to determine what
effects (behaviors) need to be attained within the
Operational Area to achieve their objectives . . . [and]
to mitigate risk and act with greater precision.”19 One
system’s approach to analyzing a theater’s environment
is through a regional strategic appraisal which is “an
assessment of a specific region in which U.S. regional
interests are determined, policies to support these
interests are identified, and strategies to support the
policies are developed.”20 The net assessment of a
country is more focused and detailed,
a systems understanding of the operational environment
in the form of a common, shared, relevant database and
a network of people . . . used to understand key relationships, dependencies and vulnerabilities within and
across political, military, economic, social, information,
and economic systems . . . [to ascertain] leverage points
such as key links and nodes . . . to influence adversary
capabilities, perceptions and decision making.21

These system analyses do not replace but complement
products such as the Joint Intelligence Preparation of
11

the Operational Environment. Sun Tzu’s dictum to
“know the enemy and know yourself, and you can
fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat,” is
reflected in a systemic theater environment analysis.
Along with the analysis of the review of the
theater’s environment, a thorough mission analysis of
given national and multinational strategic direction
is needed. This analysis derives objectives, desired
effects, and key assumptions.22 The emerging effectsbased approach in joint operations is useful in deriving
theater strategic objectives, effects, and assumptions
because its systemic analysis examines all aspects of
an opponent or friendly system, and coordinates the
application of all instruments of national power. This
process “enhanc[es] the probability that objectives can
be translated more accurately into actionable direction
. . . [giving] a shared common understanding of
the effects . . . before tasks are prescribed and assigned
. . .”23 With an improved understanding of the
assigned mission through the effects-based approach,
the combatant commander identifies and prioritizes
specified, implied, and essential tasks, which tailor
and orient a higher command’s purpose to regional
conditions.24 Determining the appropriate scope and
content of the mission, and proposing changes to it
through restating it back to higher headquarters is
an important aspect of this mission analysis. Once
the theater’s situation and mission are thoroughly
analyzed, the theater commander articulates his intent
through strategic vision, which then guides theater
objectives, theater strategic end states, and mission
statements.25
Based upon the strategic estimate, the combatant
commander develops strategic alternatives (broad
statements of what is to be accomplished). The
combatant commander then selects implementing
12

actions that will support national or multinational
policies and address the requirements identified in the
theater. The selected implementing actions become the
basis for the theater strategic concept, which sets the
stage for planning and actions in broad flexible terms.
Such plans and concepts include those for theater
security cooperation, combat operations, and support
throughout the range of military operations.26
From the analyzed mission and regional environment, the combatant commander determines the possible means his command will employ to attain
national goals. There may be diverse sets of options
to address the tasks and problems faced by the
combatant commander. These courses of action must
be evaluated, compared to actions that other players
in the region may take, and then the most appropriate
one(s) selected to complete the strategic estimate.27
Using a systemic approach, any military actions must
be integrally coordinated with a larger interagency
effort of diplomatic, information and economic
efforts.28 The combatant commander also organizes
command relationships, and requests resources
required to fulfill any requirements derived from this
theater strategy development process. Theater strategy
is the basis for initiating and coordinating international
programs and activities, requesting support for the
theater, and synergizing actions and activities with the
other combatant commands. The resulting estimate is
continuously updated based on a constantly changing
environment in the theater, and to maintain consistency
with national objectives and end states.29
Thus, theater strategy is derived from U.S. national
strategy, and theater strategy determines operations
and activities. No two combatant commands follow
the same process, format, or procedures for developing
theater strategy. Each combatant command has
13

adapted its method to the peculiarities of its region
and the personalities of its commanders. The process
described here is generic, but it is the basis for many of
the processes found among the geographic combatant
commands. The Secretary of Defense reviews each
combatant commander’s theater strategy.
Vignette 2: Tom Clancy, with Tony Zinni and Tom
Koltz, Battle Ready, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons,
2004, pp. 311-314.
These are General Zinni’s reflections on the state
of USCENTCOM as he takes command in 1997. What
he describes here is the formal and deliberate method
of developing theater strategy, in contrast to the crisis
method described in Vignette 1. He discusses the
sources of national strategy which he must consider
to determine his theater’s mission, summarizes the
theater’s situation, states the strategic alternatives, and
proposes ways of implementing his strategy, including
operational and theater engagement plans. Note that
General Zinni identifies a new charge to “shape” the
region. Shaping is a significant addition to theater
strategy and will be presented later in this paper in the
Theater Security Cooperation section.
Theater Strategy Implementation—
Joint Operation Planning.
Theater strategy implements many activities of
a combatant command through its guidance, which
ensures those activities are in direct support of the
theater strategic objectives which in turn support
national objectives and strategy. One of the most
important missions for a geographic combatant
commander is to deter hostile actions against U.S. and
friendly-nation interests, and, if necessary, to counter
14

such hostile actions through contingency operations.
To be prepared for such contingencies, combatant
commanders conduct joint operation planning, which
translates national and theater strategy into operational
concepts. Joint operation planning encompasses both
contingency planning and crisis action planning
(CAP), as coordinated at the operational level through
campaign planning.30 The process for both contingency
and crisis action planning is similar, although their
time lines and the validity of assumptions used are
significantly different. DoD is developing a modified
method of campaign planning known as adaptive
planning, which is meant to incorporate both
contingency and crisis action planning into one. The
elements introduced here, however, are still valid
and will be incorporated into adaptive planning. The
current joint operation planning method remains
instructive for the basic process until adaptive planning
is validated and approved.
Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products
Situational Awareness

Operational
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Planning
Functions
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Execution
Strategic
Guidance

Concept
Development
IPR

Approved
Mission
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IPR
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Approved
Concept

Approved
Plan

Products
Warning
Order

Planning
Order

Plan Assessment
(Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute)

Operation
Order

{

Six Month Review Cycle

Base Plan (BPLAN)
Concept Plan (CONPLAN)
Operation Plan (OPLAN)

Alert
Order

Execute
Order
Deployment
Order

IPR in-progress review

Figure 6. Joint Operation Planning Activities,
Functions, and Products (JP 5-0, Aug 2006, Figure I-3).
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Contingency planning is the means during
peacetime by which contingencies are anticipated and
deliberate plans developed. These plans are based
upon the Secretary of Defense’s CPG and CJCS’s
JSCP.31 To ensure close adherence to national strategic
goals and guidance, contingency plans undergo an inprogress review (IPR) by the Secretary of Defense at
critical points in the development process (see Figure
6). The process also involves the entire Joint Planning
and Execution Community (JPEC, see Figure 7), an
informal group consisting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and their staff, the military services and their major
commands, the combatant commands and their
subordinate commands, and the combat support
agencies.32 Contingency plans are fully coordinated by
the JPEC, and often have forces and resources allocated
to them before execution. Because of its thorough
coordination, contingency planning normally takes
THE JOINT PLANNING AND EXECUTION COMMUNITY

Strategic
Guidance
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMAND
SUBORDINATE
COMMANDS

MILITARY
SERVICES

Subordinate Unified
Commands

Service Major Commands
Supporting
Combatant Commands

Service and Functional
Components

Combat Support Agencies

Joint Task Forces

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

Figure 7. Joint Planning and Execution Community
(JP 5-0, August 2006, Figure I-2).
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longer to complete than crisis action planning. The
assumptions upon which contingency plans are based
are important to the process, but may not always be
valid when faced with the actual crisis envisioned. For
that reason, nearly all contingency plans are modified
through crisis action planning before execution. To
keep them as relevant as possible, contingency plans
are updated regularly.33
Crisis action planning occurs as the contingency
it addresses unfolds. CAP is more immediate than
contingency planning, and the contingency plan
assumptions are either verified as fact or disproved,
leading to the plan’s modification.34 CAP often builds
upon previously conducted contingency planning, but
a crisis could occur for which no previous planning has
taken place,35 as happened with OEF. In such situations,
operations orders are developed from scratch rather
than modified from operations plans.
Theater strategy, as translated into theater plans
through the joint operation planning process, is one
major example of how to execute theater strategy.
Vignette 3: Tom Clancy, with Tony Zinni and Tom
Koltz, Battle Ready, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons,
2004, pp. 11-13.
These are Gen Zinni’s memoirs covering his time as
the USCENTCOM combatant commander from 1997
to 2000. Operation DESERT VIPER, recounted here,
was one of the periodic “smack downs” of Iraq after
Operation DESERT STORM in response to hindering
the work of United Nations (UN) weapons inspectors.
This reading highlights the process of getting an
operational plan approved by the President in a crisis,
and the balance of authority between the Service chiefs
and combatant commanders.

17

Theater Strategy Implementation—
Products and Activities.
To implement a theater’s strategy, and thereby
national security strategy, a variety of activities and
products are involved. Through the contingency
planning process just described, combatant
commanders’ staffs produce the estimates, base plans,
concept plans and operational plans (also called
level 1, 2, 3, and 4 plans), and crisis action planning
that collaboratively coordinate efforts, and identify
forces, functional support, and resources to deter
and defend against aggression, or participate in
assistance to civil authorities.36 Another major means
of implementing theater strategy is through theater
security cooperation. The theater security cooperation
strategies and plans that result from this process are
part of the joint operation plans family, and will be
covered in more detail in a following section. Theater
organization and theater logistics cover other crucial
aspects of implementing theater strategy, by arranging
how to attain unity of effort among the U.S. services,
government agencies, and other countries’ forces. This
is accomplished through organizing the commands
in a theater, and sustaining theater strategy and its
activities and plans through logistics and movement.
Although the above activities are the major
products and efforts needed to support theater strategy
and national objectives, there are other activities that
also are elements of implementing a theater strategy.
Since the combatant commander is responsible for
developing joint operation plans for his theater, he also
is responsible for ensuring that the force capabilities
needed to execute those plans are available to him
through apportionment in Global Force Manage-

18

ment or the “Forces For Memorandum.” At the theater
strategic level, force planning encompasses all of those
activities performed by the supported combatant commander and the subordinate component commands to
select forces and capabilities to accomplish an assigned
mission, or request capability found wanting.37 However, having forces assigned, attached, or apportioned
for an operation plan (OPLAN) is of little use if those
forces are not ready for their mission. For that reason,
another means by which the combatant commander
helps to implement theater strategy is through the
training of joint forces and realistically exercising
them. These force readiness activities are important
parts of security assistance which is explained in a later
section.
Another means of implementing theater strategy
is through a Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund
(previously known as the CINC’s Initiative Fund). The
expenses for running the various geographic combatant
command headquarters are paid through the military
service budgets and leave little flexibility on how the
money is spent. Some combatant commanders have
chaffed at this funding arrangement, believing that
service chiefs had little interest in or understanding
of the engagement programs.38 The Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund, although relatively small, is
spent at the discretion of the combatant commander in
order to further the needs of his command, and often
supports theater strategy. This can be used as seed
money to start programs to be funded formally later,
or to directly support unanticipated situations through
theater security cooperation.39 Such funds may provide
significant regional leverage to a theater strategy if
judiciously applied.
As an end product of theater strategy, combatant
commanders feed back to national authorities their
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inputs to better develop and refine national strategy and
priorities. The Integrated Priority Lists (IPL) (see Figure
3), for instance, are high priority requirements that fill
capability shortfalls that a combatant commander’s
component forces face when trying to accomplish their
assigned missions. This feedback gives combatant
commanders a formal voice in force planning, national
level apportionment of resources, and development
of strategic concepts in the Programming, Planning
Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES, see Figure
3).40 Another feedback mechanism is the Joint Quarterly
Readiness Review (JQRR, formerly the Joint Military
Readiness Review [JMRR]) in which the services and
combatant commanders respond to a stated future
crisis scenario with limiting factors (LIMFACS) and
deficiencies that may reduce mission accomplishment
in their command. JQRR feedback covers many
aspects of theater strategy—mobility and sustainment;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
joint headquarters command and control; and joint
personnel and training—that may be beyond the
control of the combatant commanders. Such feedback
influences national political-military assessments,
and the formulation of strategic policy and planning
guidance.41 The end result should focus the senior
national leadership on pressing readiness issues in
order to determine where to place additional emphasis
and resources, and thereby better support the theater
strategy through improved funding, assigned forces,
and combat systems.
Vignette 4: Tom Clancy, with Tony Zinni and Tom
Koltz. Battle Ready, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons,
2004, pp. 331-334.
These are General Zinni’s memoirs from the time he
was Commander of USCENTCOM, implementing his
20

theater strategy and the challenge of gaining support
for his strategy from national authorities. General
Zinni raises a point about the control of funding for
the combatant commanders, and the built-in tension
between the Services and combatant commands.
THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION
Theater Security Cooperation Overview.
Theater security cooperation (TSC, formerly
known as theater engagement) is part of the combatant
commander’s theater strategy of linking military
activities involving other countries to U.S. national
strategic objectives. The characteristics of TSC are
inherently joint, interagency, and multinational.
Whereas much of the rest of theater strategy is primarily
military in nature, theater security cooperation is a DoD
effort that includes more of a diplomatic, information,
and economic flavor.42 As part of a greater interagency
effort in national security, TSC is a complementary
activity with other agencies such as the DoS with
its oversight of security assistance programs, or the
Department of Justice which has the lead in fighting
drug and human trafficking.
TSC seeks to shape and maintain the international
environment within which the U.S. military must act
during both peacetime and contingencies. TSC consists
of both the overall theater environment in which it is
executed, and the programs that execute it. The purpose
of TSC is to support the Secretary of Defense’s security
cooperation effort and to reinforce each geographic
combatant commander’s mission to deter aggression
by strengthening ties and interoperability with friendly
military forces, supporting regional stability and
U.S. values, and showing U.S. resolve in supporting
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allies.43 Each command’s TSC is customized to the
specific geographic, economic, political, demographic,
and military situations found in a region. By design,
TSC stresses activities that directly support theater
operational plans and objectives, which is unlike the
previous philosophy of theater engagement which
relied upon varied military activities to only generate
bilateral good will. TSC is a continuous process that
is pertinent through all phases of joint operation
planning. Its multiplying effect is most felt during
Phase 0, Shape, and Phase 1, Deter, operations because
each can successfully isolate adversaries and buttress
allies on its own—reducing the need to resort to combat
operations.44
Each region’s theater security cooperation
direction is derived from specific national strategic
direction known as security cooperation. Security
cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral
and multilateral defense activities conducted with
other countries to serve U.S. security interests, and, as
a result, build the right defense partnerships for the
future.45 Although foreign policy is the purview of
DoS, DoD also is actively engaged in foreign policy
through security cooperation. At the strategic level,
Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, states:
Security cooperation consists of a focused program of
bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted
with foreign countries to serve U.S. mutual security
interests and build defense partnerships. Security
cooperation efforts should also be aligned to support
strategic communication themes, messages, and
actions. The [Secretary of Defense] identifies security
cooperation goals, assesses the effectiveness of security
cooperation activities and revises goals when required
to ensure continued support for U.S. interests abroad.
Although they can shift over time, examples of typical
security cooperation goals include: creating favorable
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military geographical balances of power, advancing
mutual defense or security arrangements; building
allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense
and multinational operations, and preventing conflict
and crisis.46

A geographic combatant commander focuses
security cooperation at the theater level by deriving
his theater security cooperation guidance from sources
such as the President’s UCP and the CJCS’s JSCP.47
However, the Secretary of Defense’s CPG Annex A,
and Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) articulate more
specific direction for the combatant commanders, Joint
Staff, each of the services, and the defense agencies.48
The SCG “sets security cooperation priorities by
tasking subordinates to prepare security cooperation
strategies and implementation plans.”49 The overall
combatant commander’s theater security cooperation
program is the interpretation of this national security
direction, and is built from the foundation of a regional
strategic appraisal. Theater security cooperation is
executed through the theater security cooperation
plan (TSCP), which proposes and prioritizes military
activities with other countries.50 The TSCP activities
must demonstrably support the theater’s strategy
and defense relationships to promote specified U.S.
security interests identified in Joint Publication 5-0,
Joint Operation Planning, as:
1) Military contacts, including senior official visits,
port visits, counterpart visits, conferences,
staff talks, and personnel and unit exchange
programs.
2) National assistance, including foreign internal
defense, security assistance programs, and
planned humanitarian and civic assistance
activities.
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3) Multinational training.
4) Multinational exercises, including those in
support of the Partnership for Peace Program.
5) Multinational education for U.S. personnel and
personnel from other nations, both overseas and
in the United States.
6) Arms control and treaty monitoring activities.51
The subordinate service components of each combatant
command (for instance, Pacific Air Forces in Pacific
Command) play an important role in TSC, especially
when directly dealing with the counterpart service
components of target nations.
Vignette 5: Tom Clancy, with Tony Zinni and Tom
Koltz, Battle Ready, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons,
2004, pp. 316-318.
These are General Zinni’s musings over the
importance of engagement (the term then used for
what we now call theater security cooperation) to
warfighting. He is outspoken for engaging in “not
strictly military activities” that still impacted the theater,
such as environmental security. He again illuminates
the importance of interagency operations, especially in
supporting “not strictly military” concerns.
Theater Security Cooperation Planning.
A TSCP is a deliberately developed plan covering
non-combat military activities with other nations
within a region. A TSCP implements the combatant
commander’s theater security cooperation strategy
and thus is a way to shape the security environment
to protect and promote U.S. interests and regional
objectives.52 A TSCP is a joint strategic plan, part of the
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joint operation planning family presented earlier. Joint
Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, describes the
TSCP planning process:
In response to direction in the DoD Security Cooperation
Guidance (SCG), [combatant commanders], service
Chiefs, and combat support agencies directors prepare
security cooperation strategies in accordance with SCG
objectives for CJCS review and Secretary of Defense
approval, with the geographic combatant commanders
as the supported entities. These strategies serve as the
basis for security cooperation planning. Collaboration
among the combatant commands, services, and combat
support agencies is essential. Equally important is the
close coordination with U.S. agencies that represent
other instruments of national power, and particularly
with the U.S. Chiefs of Mission (Ambassadors) in the
CCDRs’ AORs.53

A TSCP is composed of a theater situation overview,
the combatant commander’s mission, how the plan
will be executed, an assessment of the program to date,
and the current plan’s implementation.54 The Situation
section is derived from an area’s regional strategic
appraisal and analyzes the environment in which the
TSCP will be implemented. The Mission states the
theater’s prioritized regional objectives as derived
from national strategic direction. The combatant
commander gives guidance on the threats to security
and stability in the theater, opportunities, assumptions,
and a planning schedule to develop a TSCP.55
The Execution section of the plan consists of the
commander’s Vision, Objectives, Prioritized Effects (all
three defining a theater strategic end state), and Concept
sections. The centerpiece is the combatant commander’s
Concept which outlines security cooperation activities,
resources, and interagency coordination needed to
realize the stated vision and objectives. If the combatant
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commander’s theater objectives are the ends of security
cooperation, then security cooperation activities
comprise the typical ways through which theater
security cooperation is executed, while the Resources
and Interagency Coordination sections represent the
means. Assessment of past theater security cooperation
is needed to improve the current plan, and those lessons
should be applied through the TSCP’s Implementation
Guidance. The Annexes provide detailed information
on the theater security activities and interagency
coordination required by the plan.56
The crucial part of a TSCP is the Concept section’s
security cooperation activities to engage other countries
and directly support the combatant commander’s
strategy and the complementary annexes. In the past,
there were eight separate categories for consideration
when developing security cooperation activities.57
The underpinning of each of these activity categories
remains solid, but since much has changed in the
perspective of joint doctrine, a modified listing of seven
theater security cooperation activity categories based
upon new Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning,
guidance would be best represented as: 1) Multinational
Exercises, 2) Multinational Training, 3) Multinational
Education, 4) Security Assistance, 5) Humanitarian
and Civic Assistance, 6) Military-to-Military Contacts,
and 7) Other Engagement Activities.
These activities should support specific theater
objectives, so not every category will be given equal
importance or weight depending upon what needs to be
accomplished. The SCG enumerates “other engagement
activities” to include bilateral information operations,
intelligence sharing, arms control and monitoring, and
defense experimentation and industrial cooperation,
among others. Once developed, each TSCP is reviewed
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by the theater’s service components to develop their
own supporting plans. Upon completion, the SCG
directs that each TSCP be forwarded to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for an annual review and inclusion
into a coordinated family of security cooperation
plans.58 This review should ensure the TSCP attains
national objectives, and that together each of the
regional TSCPs is sustainable at a global level. These
theater plans also are coordinated with similar plans
that each of the services produce, and are supported by
defense agencies such as the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA); the military services; and unified commands
such as U.S. Transportation Command or U.S.
Special Operations Command.59 The Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is particularly important
to security assistance since it manages many of the DoDauthorized international programs,60 and its mission
is to directly support the combatant commanders,
their theater strategy and security cooperation plans
through interaction, advocating policy, planning, and
execution on their behalf.61
The interagency process should require a national
level review of the military’s theater security cooperation programs to ensure unified action of the various
federal departments, but there is no process to prioritize
efforts within the federal government. This situation
has led one U.S. Army War College scholar to observe,
“because there is no national level prioritization,
each particular component is left to determine
which requirement to support.”62 Direction from the
Secretary of Defense in his SCG attempts to remedy
this situation, as part of his transformation efforts in
security cooperation. Since the inauguration of the
SCG in 2003, theater security cooperation strategy
and its implementation plans must be written in a
prescribed format, and annual assessments provided to
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the Secretary of Defense.63 This should standardize the
products of what has been an ad hoc system. However,
since no two combatant commands follow the same
process, the procedures for developing theater strategy
remain different.
Vignette 6: Tom Clancy, with Tony Zinni and Tom
Koltz, Battle Ready, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
2004, pp. 337-338.
This reading from General Zinni’s memoirs as the
USCENTCOM commander is an example of engaging
Yemen to keep it from becoming a failed state. He
offers several ways through security assistance and
intelligence sharing to make a difference. Notice how
theater security cooperation works to benefit both
parties, and how he leverages several types of activities
to achieve his purpose.
Theater Security Cooperation Execution.
As JP 3-0, Joint Operations, notes, “security
cooperation is a key element of global and theater
shaping operations . . .,”64 and more of a combatant
command staff’s time is spent on these security
cooperation activities than any other aspect of theater
strategy. In a resource constrained environment, as
all government operations are, the trick to executing
TSC is matching the TSC requirements, which the
combatant commander determines are needed to
succeed in his mission, with finite resources allocated to
each commander in competition with other priorities.
Prioritization of goals and resources is a necessity
in TSC. For each of the theater security cooperation
activities (see Figure 8), the combatant commander
must plan for the forces and command organization
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needed to control these endeavors, and the movement
and sustainment aspects that support them. All of
these various actions to implement theater security
cooperation activities are ultimately meant to prepare
the command to meet its assigned missions, to balance
the risk, and manage the consequences inherent in
trying to attain the objectives of its strategy in a fiscal
and resource-constrained environment.
Typical TSC Activities
Multinational Exercises
- Field Training Exercises
- Command Post
Simulations

Military-to-Military Contacts
- Senior officer visits
- Port visits
- Joint Contact Teams

Multinational Training
- Joint Combined
Exchange Training

Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance
- Mine clearing
- Excess property

Multinational Education
- Regional Center for
Security Studies
- Senior Service Colleges

Other Activities
- Exercise related
construction
- Intelligence security
cooperation
- Information Operations
- Command and Control
programs

Security Assistance
- Foreign Military Sales
- International Military
Education and Training

Figure 8. Samples of Theater Security
Cooperation Activities.
Although the commanders and staffs of the
combatant commands, military services, and defense
support agencies each play an important role in
planning and executing theater security cooperation,
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the Security Assistance Offices (SAOs), which are part
of the country team of most American embassies, are
the “point men.” The SAOs are military members, DoD
civilians, and host nation employees who work closely
with the host government to ensure that their security
requirements and the combatant commander’s security
cooperation plan for that country mesh. The SAO
members also ensure that their efforts in supporting
the military elements of power with the host nation are
synchronized with the broader diplomatic, economic,
and information activities established by the American
Ambassador referencing the National Security Strategy
and DoS’ Strategic Plan. The SAO usually administers
International Military Education and Training
(IMET) and other training and education programs
by matching host country needs to available U.S.
positions, and coordinating the U.S. funding allotted
to some countries. SAOs arrange for sales or transfers
of military goods, services, support, and training to
the host country through grants and Foreign Military
Sales, which are made directly through the U.S.
Government. SAOs also may be involved in the transfer
of munitions and other defense articles through the
direct commercial sales process, in which countries
purchase directly from U.S. vendors, after licensing by
DoS. SAOs, in coordination with the Defense Attaché’s
Office, which is also part of the country team, also may
be responsible for coordinating bilateral exercises,
determining U.S. participation in trade and air shows,
overseeing exchange programs and military-tomilitary exchanges, or being responsible for a host of
many other security cooperation activities. The overlap
of duties between these two military agencies requires
close cooperation between the two.65 SAOs are the
combatant commander’s direct representatives to their
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host country, and are responsible for the success of
the command’s theater strategy and theater security
cooperation in their affected area.
The planning and execution of these security
cooperation activities by the SAO and other involved
DoD organizations directly support the combatant
commanders when preparing for future military
operations, especially when engaging with friendly
and neutral countries, and when deterring hostilities
with potential opponents: the first two critical phases
of Operations Planning (see Figure 9). The U.S. military
employs a full spectrum of actions to protect national
interests ranging from mutual peace-time cooperation
to full combat against aggressors. Shaping may be
the most important of these OPLAN phases because,
if successfully conducted, shaping activities can, by
themselves, reduce the frequency of crises, and thereby
avert the need to resort to combat operations. Shaping
actions also promote U.S. and coalition partners’
mutual interests, increase understanding of the region,
and strengthen future multinational military bonds
and operations. This shaping is accomplished through
security activities that organize and train forces,
maintain operational area access, rehearse operational
plans through exercises, employ space assets, and
anticipate stability operations that may occur in later
phases.66 Shaping activities are the foundation upon
which the other phases of military operations are
developed.
Deter phase operations are closely linked to the
shaping activities, although in the former the role
of theater security cooperation diminishes. Deter
operations are overt conventional deterrence or
increased readiness to avert the need for the violent
use of military force. The Deter phase prepares the U.S.
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military to conduct potential high-tempo operations
intending to preempt further adverse actions by an
opponent. With the contingency better defined in this
phase, deterrence operations facilitate joint intelligence
preparation of the operational environment and
understanding of the operational area's physical
environment; prepare the operational area through
use of special operations, stability operations, civil
affairs activities, and logistics sustainment; continue
the employment of space capabilities; enable force
protection; and use flexible deterrent options in order
to isolate an opponent and stymie hostile intentions
before resorting to combat.67 While shaping activities
and deterrence operations directly benefit the most
from theater security cooperation, theater security
cooperation spans all six phases of military operations
and is a valuable augmentation to each. Theater security
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cooperation is a continuing activity for each combatant
command, military service, and defense agency during
all levels of peace, contingencies, and war.
Vignette 7: Tom Clancy, with Tony Zinni and Tom
Koltz, Battle Ready, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
2004, pp. 181-183.
These are General Zinni's memoirs covering his time
as the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) deputy
J-3 from 1990 to 1992. After the fall of the Berlin Wall,
but before the end of the Soviet Union, the USEUCOM
commander, General Galvin, sent a contingent of officers
to Moscow as part of his command’s engagement
activities. Then Brigadier General Zinni discusses the
importance and intent of military-to-military contacts
for a combatant commander.
Summary.
This overview of theater strategy and theater
security cooperation is a primer on one of the most
important tools the U.S. military uses to engage other
countries, deter unwanted actions, and defend U.S.
and friendly nation interests. To be effective, theater
strategy and theater security cooperation must be
derived from and consistently linked to national and
multinational strategic guidance and policy, and
formulated to meet the requirements found in each of
the world’s regions. To attain the security goals of a
combatant commander’s strategy, the proper support
for joint operation plans through organizational
structure, force projection, sustainment, readiness
training, and force development input is essential.
A crucial means to attain a combatant commander’s
objectives is through the proper derivation and
33

development of theater security cooperation. Theater
security cooperation directly supports national goals at
the regional level, and enhances military operations by
obviating the need for military action, or by preparing
the environment better for U.S. military intervention
should it be necessary. Theater strategy is an important
part of realizing national strategy around the world,
and theater security cooperation is not only one of the
most powerful tools in attaining the goals of theater
strategy but, through its ability to obviate the need
for violent military action, a cost effective tool as well.
The OEF case study shows how each part of theater
strategy and theater security cooperation is manifest in
an unexpected military operation and the actions that
led up to it in the years before.
THEATER STRATEGY: OPERATION ENDURING
FREEDOM CASE STUDY
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Overview.
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in
Afghanistan was not the campaign for which the U.S.
military had prepared in the years following Operation
DESERT STORM. For a variety of reasons, OEF was
a combination of high technology weapons and
sophisticated command and control with tactics and
equipment that U.S. forces had not seriously employed
in nearly a century. By necessity, its operations and
support were both joint and combined in ways the
armed forces had not considered before. Yet, by
relying on international connections established in the
years leading to this unexpected operation, modifying
established processes, and the creativity and ingenuity
of professional and well-led forces, U.S. forces were
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able to complete their assigned combat missions.
Doing so was difficult, however, and presented many
challenges.
OEF was a short-notice, “come as you are” operation.
It was fought in a region in which the U.S. military
had completed little contingency planning, conducted
with minimal crisis action preparation, and the active
combat part was of relatively short duration and used
limited U.S. forces. It was an operational success,
replacing the pariah government of the Taliban with
one more representative of the people of Afghanistan
and willing to adhere to the conventions of civilized
nations. Terrorist organizations, most notably alQai’da, lost an important sanctuary for their activities,
and were weakened. However, this operation also
became the basis for significant changes to military
and interagency processes and operations that were
to follow, due to the problems encountered during
its execution. Some of these problems, especially
the interdependence of operations and strategy and
security cooperation at the national and theater levels,
are the focus of this case study.
This case study covers the theater security cooperation endeavors in USCENTCOM from 1996 to 2001,
and the national and theater strategy that developed
to combat terrorism during the first campaign waged.
It reviews and applies the theater strategy concepts
described in this paper, and contrasts the doctrinal
process of developing theater strategy with the
reactive crisis action methods that were adapted from
the established processes for OEF. The next section
focuses on the national direction given to the combatant
commander waging OEF and the operations that
resulted. With this better understanding of operations
and direction given during the operation, the final
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part of this case study presents the theater security
cooperation that preceded the operation, and how it
affected combat operations. The first reading, below, is
an early analysis of OEF to familiarize the reader with
that operation.
Reading 1: John A. Bonin, “Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM: An In-Stride Analysis of the Afghanistan
Campaign,” Carlisle Barracks, PA: Department of
Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, U.S. Army
War College, May 2002, pp. 3-23.
This study is an early analysis of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM highlighting the difficulty
of executing national and theater level strategy in an
unexpected situation, and using joint forces to combat
terrorism. Read this to ascertain national strategic
directions and missions given to the combatant
commander, and then for an understanding of how
operations evolved. As an early review of an operation,
this study is subject to further revision.
Theater Strategy and Crisis Planning in Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM.
This section presents the development of combat
operations in ENDURING FREEDOM, which did not
follow the contingency planning process as presented in
this paper. The attacks on the U.S. homeland surprised
many by the quarter from which they came. As a
result, there was little direct guidance or preparation
for military operations against Afghanistan before
September 11, 2001 (9/11), although diplomatic,
information, and economic elements of power already
were engaged in isolating the Taliban regime and
pressuring al-Qai’da. Plans existed in USCENTCOM
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for strikes against Afghani targets, as had been done
by the previous administration, but there were no
plans for ground operations or regime change, hence
this was a crisis action planning process. Nonetheless,
national and theater guidance were quickly developed
into strategies that guided operations. This part of the
case study contrasts the contingency planning process
of developing national and theater strategies with
the ad hoc process that followed the 9/11 attacks, to
show that the deliberate process can be adapted when
needed, and that it is often a messier process than
military manuals show. Indeed, to make matters worse,
as national strategic direction developed and evolved
during OEF, the operation’s goals and objectives
rapidly changed to keep pace.
Below, read the presidential administration's
national security policy directive that was too late in
influencing policy with regard to the Taliban, and the
examples of national security direction that were given
on the fly. The evolving national security direction
and demand for immediate action made developing
a coherent theater strategy to counter terrorism,
particularly al-Qai’da and the governments that
harbored the group, difficult to develop.
Reading 2: Combating Terrorism, National Security
Policy Directive (NSPD) 9. Summary made by the
Federation of American Scientists at www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/nspd/nspd-9.htm, October 25, 2001.
The Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
is a watchdog group that acts as a convenient
clearinghouse for government documents. From open
source reporting, FAS has assembled the content of
the otherwise classified NSPD 9, which was the first
policy directive of the new Bush administration to
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address terrorism and al-Qai’da. Ironically it was set
to be signed on September 10, 2001. This was one of
the few national security direction documents issued
during OEF, and it was released 18 days after combat
operations started.
Reading 3: Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2002, pp. 30-33.
In this passage, Bob Woodward chronicles the
formation of national strategic direction for the crisis
action response that led to OEF. The President's
speech on the evening of 9/11 establishes the “Bush
Doctrine,” declaring that America would pursue those
who planned and executed terrorist acts, and those
who harbored them. Security policy and national
strategic direction are sometimes promulgated in this
way through dramatic public speeches, especially
in a crisis. In the end, national strategy is always the
President’s to make; in this case, the President did not
consult with the Vice President, Secretary of State, or
Secretary of Defense.
Reading 4: Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2002, pp. 97-99, 101.
On September 17, 2001, Bob Woodward recounts a
National Security Council (NSC) meeting in which the
President gives clear direction based on discussions
held earlier on September 16 (pp. 78-81). He chooses
the level of the military response against Afghanistan,
how wide to make the war on terrorism, and issues
diplomatic initiatives, as part of national security
direction. In the second reading, memos are signed
which formally issue strategic direction for nearly
all aspects of diplomatic, information, military, and
economic responses.
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Reading 5: Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2002, pp. 229-234, especially 231.
This snapshot by Bob Woodward chronicles the
continuing formation of national strategic direction
for OEF. Objectives for the campaign are examined in
detail by the cabinet principals. Note the issues that
arise with relying on indigenous opposition forces,
the discussion on interagency cooperation, support
from other countries, and prioritization. The principal
cabinet members involved may be trying to direct
events outside of the control of the United States, and
are doing so on October 11, 2001, 5 days after the start
of hostilities. “Jawbreaker” is the code name of the first
CIA team operating inside Afghanistan.
Reading 6: Tommy Franks and Malcom McConnell,
American Soldier, New York: Regan Books, 2004, pp.
249-252, 255-262, 278-282.
In his autobiography, the commander of
USCENTCOM recounts how his command built the
guidance and plan that directed OEF. He had to design
the military response with minimal guidance from
command authorities because they were developing
national direction during this time too, as the readings
above indicated. The USCENTCOM staff used their
best judgment of what their bosses would want, and
started to build a theater strategy to meet the new
situation. This passage outlines the three options that
eventually evolved into OEF.
Theater Security Cooperation and Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM.
As a short notice crisis, OEF was essentially fought
with the environment, forces, and processes that were
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in place on September 10, 2001. The national and
theater security cooperation pursued with countries
of the USCENTCOM region prior to hostilities set the
stage for what was possible, or not possible, during the
operation. Although additional diplomatic, information, military, and economic actions were accomplished
in the harried, confused days that followed the 9/11
attacks, operations were conducted based on the
international political environment that USCENTCOM
and the State Department carefully constructed in the
years prior. Since few people seriously planned for
a regime change in Afghanistan before September
2001, these security cooperation efforts were focused
on achieving outcomes for different purposes and in
different places. The personal contacts, established
trust and procedures among governments, familiarity
with bases and forces, and exercised interoperability,
however, gave USCENTCOM operational flexibility
to pursue OEF. In particular, USCENTCOM benefited
from international assistance which provided overflight permission, basing, intelligence, forces, or
many other forms of support and aid from Kuwait to
Kyrgyzstan and beyond.
The readings below offer examples of theater security cooperation efforts that preceded September 2001,
and set the stage for OEF. These are the shaping activities that theater security cooperation supports, so you
will read examples of security cooperation continuing
around the region, as another means of influencing the
outcome of the conflict. These documents show what
was done to engage the political and military interests
in this region, and how such relations were used to
support OEF. Note also the weaknesses of the security
cooperation efforts that left operational gaps to fill, and
threatened the success of OEF. The readings below are
40

presented in the approximate chronologic sequence
under three successive USCENTCOM commanders,
General Peay, General Zinni, and General Franks.
Reading 7: J. H. Binford Peay, Game Plan 1996-1997,
MacDill AFB, FL: U.S. Central Command, Public
Affairs Office, 1996, pp. 3-14.
This is an overview of theater strategy and
engagement used by the Commander, USCENTCOM
from 1996 to 1997. Since theater strategy and theater
security cooperation are long-range activities, the
actions taken or not taken during this time would have
reached fruition during OEF. Read this document to
see how USCENTCOM approached engagement with
key supporters of the future OEF effort, to include
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain.
Although in its AOR, crucial governments affected by
OEF, Iran and Afghanistan, did not have diplomatic ties
with the United States and therefore were not directly
influenced by theater strategy; however, that strategy
may have been formed with those countries in mind.
Other key players such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan
were not assigned by the Unified Command Plan to
USCENTCOM’s AOR until 1999. Although marked
For Official Use Only, this document’s proponent has
determined that the protective marking no longer
applies.
Reading 8: Tom Clancy, with Tony Zinni and Tom
Koltz, Battle Ready, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons,
2004, pp. 335-336.
In this set of readings from General Zinni’s memoirs,
he is commander of USCENTCOM. He writes about
a time where the relationships he gained through the
military-to-military relationships of theater security
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cooperation opened doors during a crisis in May 1998,
which were otherwise unavailable. His insight on
Pakistan’s views toward cooperating with the United
States before the tragedies on 9/11 is important, and
sheds some understanding on Pakistan’s involvement
in OEF.
Reading 9: Tom Clancy, with Tony Zinni and Tom
Koltz, Battle Ready, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons,
2004, pp. 342-343.
In this reading from General Zinni’s memoirs,
he discusses his first visit to Central Asia as the
commander of USCENTCOM in September 1998. He
analyzes the state of affairs between these countries
and the United States before 9/11, and the problems
they faced. He accesses the effectiveness of his theater
security cooperation plan, and the growing threat of
al-Qai’da in the region.
Reading 10: Tommy R. Franks, Posture of Military
Forces—U.S. Central Command, MacDill AFB, FL:
U.S. Central Command, March 28, 2001, Posture
statement presented to the 107th Congress, House of
Representatives Committee on the Armed Services,
pp. 13-57, accessed at: commdocs.house.gov/committees/
security/has087000.000/has087000_0.HTM, on September 25, 2006.
The commander, U.S. Central Command gave this
summary of the state of his command and region 6
months before the commencement of OEF. He starts by
citing activities that are part of his theater engagement
plan (now known as theater security cooperation plan).
General Franks presents threats in the region, which
are many, but only specifically mentions Afghanistan
or Central Asia twice, once obliquely through terrorism
and once with smuggling. If central Asia was not a
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concern to Congress or USCENTCOM, it then follows
that the theater strategy would not address this region
sufficiently either.
Reading 11: Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New
York: Simon and Schuster, 2002, pp. 172-173, 199.
At the September 29, 2001 NSC meeting, Bob
Woodward’s account stresses national security cooperation efforts. Multinational support is beginning,
but Uzbekistan remains an unknown. A key question
from this meeting is “We need to identify what the
Pentagon wants from countries . . .?” By October 4, in
the second reading, Uzbekistan was supporting U.S.
military requirements. Security cooperation seems to
have achieved its desired effect.
Reading 12: Joel E. Williamson and Jennifer D. P.
Moroney, “Security Cooperation Pays Off: A Lesson
from the Afghan War,” DFI Government Practice,
Inc., publication, web site publications, @dfi-intl.com,
accessed at disam.osd.mil/pubs/INDEXES/Journals/
Journal_Index/v.24_3/Williamson,%20Joel%20E.,%20an
d%20Moroney,%20Jennifer%20D.P.,%20Dr..pdf on July
15, 2006, pp. 79-82.
This article gives a brief overview of the types of
security cooperation that the United States conducted
in Central Asia by country between 1996 and 2001 and
the operational impact they had for OEF. The article
advocates for increased use of security cooperation
because it is a cost effective military operations
enabler.
Case Study Points to Consider.
1. In order to examine the effectiveness of theater
security cooperation in supporting combat operations
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during OEF, we must first note the theater strategy,
missions, and objectives that guided its efforts.
Identify the national strategic guidance given to the
USCENTCOM commander in the wake of the 9/11
attacks, and the formal national strategic direction
given in documents that preceded the attack but might
still be applicable to the situation. Comment on how
effective the guidance was towards reaching its goals.
2. After identifying the national strategic guidance
given, identify the mission and goals that General
Franks issued to his command to guide the OEF effort,
and show the links between national and theater
guidance, if any.
3. Since there was little time to reflect on the
situation and action was demanded quickly, was the
right national strategic and theater guidance given, did
it sufficiently cover what was needed, and did it outline
what was required to implement it? As an operational
commander, was there something else you would have
wished was given? Was the guidance given sufficient
to reach the goals that were set?
4. Many restraints and constraints were placed on
military operations, because of the environment in
which OEF was fought. That environment was shaped
in large part by the theater security cooperation policies
and activities that USCENTCOM engaged in before
and during OEF. Identify the theater security activities
that occurred or were proposed between 1996 and 2001,
and critique their influence on successes and problems
in OEF. Were these TSCP activities able to support
combat operations in a way and place not considered
when they were proposed? Discuss this in terms of the
theater security cooperation categories (Multinational
Exercises, Multinational Training, Multinational
Education, Security Assistance, Humanitarian and
Civic Assistance, Military-to-Military Contacts, or
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Other Engagement Activities) as conducted with
countries in the region and surrounding regions.
5. TSCPs are meant to shape the AOR for potential
future operations, and the OEF case study scenario
here is different only in that the OEF events already
have occurred, so we know the “future” with certainty.
Knowing now what problems will need to be resolved
for the “future,” but remaining based on the general
situation and guidance in 1996, what theater security
cooperation activities should be developed to better
prepare for anticipated combat operations in Central
Asia?
6. As with any government endeavor, a TSCP
is restrained by limited funds, resources, and time.
Therefore, the activities of a good TSCP are written with
an eye to salesmanship, meaning selling the Secretary
of Defense, the President, and the Congress on how
well the activities support national goals and objectives
to attain funding. The prioritization, integration, and
synergy among the activities of a TSCP, and with the
activities of the TSCPs of other combatant commands,
are selling points. Clear succinct descriptions of the
TSCP activities are also important if we are to influence
busy decisionmakers. For all of these reasons, integrate
the pieces of the TSCP that were developed earlier,
looking for prioritization and synergy among the
plan’s activities; clear adherence to national guidance
through ends and ways links; firm grounding in the
scenario and addressing a problem of concern; and
activities that clearly describe themselves in terms of
who, what, where, when, why, and how.
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